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Since the seminal work of Jappelli (1990), it has become standard to identify as liquidity-constrained,
borrowers who were either turned down for credit or did not apply because they might be turned down.
In this paper, we show that the so-called ￿denied or discouraged￿proxy does not capture accurately
consumers￿credit access when consumers seek credit to ￿nance expenditure on durable goods. Our
sample is drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We document systematic misclassi￿cation
of unconstrained households as constrained. We argue that: for durables, this proxy captures best the
intensity put forth by the borrower when shopping for a loan.
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11 Introduction
Borrowing constraints can have far reaching implications on a variety of policy issues including ￿scal
stimulus, income inequality, ￿nancial development and economic growth (Johnson, Parker and Souleles,
2006; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Jappelli and Pagano, 1994). In practice,
however, it is di¢ cult to identify credit-constrained consumers because we usually observe the amount of
credit transacted rather than the demand for loans or the supply.
Following the seminal paper of Jappelli (1990), a large body of the literature on credit markets has
classi￿ed as credit-constrained those households whose credit applications have been rejected by a ￿nancial
institution (henceforth ￿denied￿ ) or those who feel that they would have been rejected had they applied
to such an institution (henceforth ￿discouraged￿ ). Jappelli￿ s key contribution is to show that survey
questions are critical if one is to elicit information on who is credit-constrained. However, a salient
assumption in Jappelli (1990) is that this measure captures constrained consumers irrespective of whether
the expenditures they want to ￿nance are durables or not. The rationale for making no distinctions is that
￿nancial institutions look at similar characteristics whether the credit application is secured or not.
The nature of the expenditures to be ￿nanced has peculiar implications for the demand for credits, and
can in turn a⁄ect the likelihood that the applicant will be denied or discouraged. One such peculiarity
is the fact that consumers￿sensitivity to changes in the interest rate is substantially higher for durable
goods than for nondurables; households being more dependant on credit to acquire durable goods. In
the United States, for instance, Mankiw (1985) found that a one percentage point increase in the interest
rate reduced consumption of nondurables and services by 0.5%, and reduced the stock of durables by
as much as 3.4%. More recently, Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2008) estimated the interest rate
elasticity for expenditures on durables, using data on car loans. They conclude that people who are
not liquidity constrained (e.g.: individuals with high income) have a higher interest rate sensitivity than
constrained individuals. If during the credit search process, such people with a high interest rate elasticity
renounce some credit o⁄ers more often than individuals with a low elasticity, then some individuals may
be incorrectly classi￿ed as, say, ￿discouraged￿applicants.1
In this paper, we analyze the reliability of the denied or discouraged measure in the particular case of
consumers seeking credit to ￿nance housing expenditures. Using a unique dataset of American households,
1This is as a result of the interest rate being the principal metric for loan-to-loan comparisons.
2we follow prior research by estimating the determinants of being denied or discouraged among observable
correlates of the loan performance. Unlike past studies, however, we also consider observable correlates
associated with the year the household reported seeking credit. In fact, correlates such as the gender and
the race of the family￿ s head are time-invariant, while others such as education, age, marital status, job
status, or location can change over time. As far as we know, there is no systematic study of the reliability
of this measure.
To preview our results, we ￿nd systematic misclassi￿cation of unconstrained households as liquidity-
constrained. More speci￿cally, denied or discouraged households in our sample display unusually superior
characteristics compared to the ￿typical￿liquidity-constrained household, and they recently obtained siz-
able mortgage loans. The denied or discouraged measure seems to capture an e⁄ect that has nothing to
do with the credit status per se, while still being correlated with a behavior associated with credit search.
In section 5, we discuss the possibility that in the case of durables this measure captures best the intensity
put forth by the applicant when shopping for a loan.
A recent paper by Johnson and Li (2010), in this journal, is also concerned with indicators of borrowing
constraints. Using the Survey of Consumer Finance, they ￿nd that the ratio of debt payments to disposable
personal income helps predict whether a household is denied or discouraged. In addition, they ￿nd that the
likelihood of being denied or discouraged is substantially higher among households with high debt service
ratio (threshold above 30%) than those with low ratios. The latter group of households is dominated
by mortgage holders because of the level of the monthly debt payments displayed. Consequently, our
￿ndings suggest that the prediction power of the debt service ratio is likely overstated by the presence of
misclassi￿ed households among households with high debt service ratios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the main ￿ndings of the literature
on liquidity constraints relative to the characteristics of consumers and we describe our sample. In section
3, we estimate a model of the probability of being denied or discouraged. In section 4, we run additional
estimations and we discuss the results. We conclude in section 5.
32 Previous studies and the data
Previous studies have tried to determine the pro￿les of liquidity constrained households.2 Irrespective
of the variable used to classify constrained consumers, most studies conducted on the U.S. economy have
found that families with low income, low net worth, who don￿ t own their home, who are large in size and/or
living in States with signi￿cant bankruptcy exemptions, are more likely to be constrained. In addition,
households that are headed by non-married, young, female or non white individuals are also more likely
to be liquidity constrained.
After Jappelli (1990), several studies used direct information on credit access, to split the sample
between households likely to be constrained and those likely to be unconstrained (see for instance, Calem
and Mester, 1995; or Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles, 1998; and more recently Johnson and Li, 2010).
Most of these papers share two caveats. First, questionnaires do not always make it clear from which
credit markets the applicant has been rejected or discouraged. Thus, denied or discouraged applicants
are systematically classi￿ed as liquidity-constrained irrespective of the types of expenditure they want to
￿nance. Second, since the year an applicant was denied or discouraged is usually unavailable in the survey,
most studies assume that the credit status evolves slowly over time.3 The data set used in this paper is
not subject to these limitations as the questionnaire only refers to housing expenditures and report the
year of the application was made.
Our study is based on a sample of American households extracted from the 1996 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). In the 1996 PSID, a special supplement to the core survey asked questions
related to the household￿ s experience when shopping for a home loan, i.e., mortgage, re￿nanced mortgage,
land contract, loan from seller, home equity, home improvement or line of credit loan, during the ￿ve-year
period preceding the survey.4 We exclude from our sample, households with missing information on the
household head￿ s age, gender, number of years of schooling, work status as well as family size, income and
geographic location. The data we work with contains 7,896 households. We de￿ne ￿mortgage-shoppers￿
as households that submitted applications for mortgage loans or thought of submitting them. Mortgage-
shoppers constitute the total pool of potential credit-constrained on the market for home loans. The
2An excellent review of this litterature can be found in Crook (2006).
3One exception is the studies that use the Survey of Household Income and Wealth of Italy (see Guiso, Jappelli, and
Terlizzese, 1996). The time period to which the questions referred to is the previous year.
4We will use the generical term ￿mortgage￿ when referring to all types of home loans, that is mortgage, re￿nanced
mortgage, land contract, loan from seller, home equity, home improvement or line of credit loan.
4￿denied￿or ￿discouraged￿are those households among mortgage-shoppers whose credit applications were
rejected by a ￿nancial institution and/or who considered any other loan options or places to borrow money
but changed their minds about applying.5
One point about this measure is worth stressing. Unlike being rejected, being classi￿ed as discouraged
entails some elements of subjectivity. Possible reasons why respondents considered a loan but decided not
to apply included ￿Interest too high￿ , ￿Down payment too high￿ , ￿Closing costs/fees too high￿ , ￿Monthly
payment too high￿ , ￿Poor service/treated unfairly￿ and ￿Other￿ . ￿Other￿ is broad enough to include
motives that are unrelated to discouragement (e.g.: a negative income shock during the credit search
process). Consequently, it is one obvious channel of misclassi￿cation of unconstrained households as being
credit-constrained. In what follows, we will explore the sensitivity of the results to a narrower de￿nition
of denied or discouraged that excludes respondents who answered ￿Other￿ (henceforth proxy II); 255
households did not specify an explicit reason.
Table 1: Selected characteristics of U.S. households
Variables Whole sample Mortgage-shoppers
Denied or Discouraged Denied Discouraged
All proxy I proxy II proxy I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household level
Income 43,982 68,110 69,013 74,367 54,747 84,421
Monthly mortgage payment 516 1,542 1,506 1,481 1,558
Homeowner (%) 0.56 0.73 0.78 0.85 0.62 0.97
Family size 2.70 3.18 3.22 3.30 3.25 3.32
Household￿ s head level
Education (years) 12.53 13.83 13.83 13.91 13.1 14.34
Age (years) 44.35 39.64 40.0 40.85 39.60 41.50
White (%) 0.62 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.57 0.87
Male (%) 0.70 0.85 0.86 0.873 0.82 0.90
Married (%) 0.52 0.73 0.743 0.78 0.68 0.83
Employed (%) 0.71 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.85 0.94
Observations 7,896 3,369 993 608 205 788
Source: Authors￿calculations based on the 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 PSID. Income is the sum of family taxa-
ble market income, family tranfer income and family social security income. proxy I (proxy II) indicates that we do (not)
classi￿ed as "discouraged", respondents who gave "Other" as the reason for considering a loan but deciding not to apply.
5People might change their mind as a result of some screening rules that lenders use to deal with the self-selection of the
pool of applicants. Ignoring discouraged applicants ultimately leads to biased estimates of the probability that consumers
are credit-constrained (Jappelli, 1990).
5About 3,369 households in our sample have shopped for a mortgage loan, and 29.5% of them (993 house-
holds) were denied or discouraged in the market for home loans (12.6% of the whole sample). Discouraged
shoppers represent 79% of this group (788 households). The primary reason for discouragement, with
more than 50% of positive responses, were ￿interest rate too high￿ ; followed by ￿Other￿with about 40%
of positive responses. On the other hand, possible reasons why respondents were rejected included ￿Credit
history problems￿ , ￿Too much debt/expenses￿ , ￿Income not high enough/not stable enough￿ , ￿Couldn￿ t
make down payment￿or ￿Other￿ . Surprisingly, the majority of denied shoppers (more than 70% of positive
responses) answered ￿Other￿ ; followed by ￿Credit history problems￿(around 20% of positive responses).
Table 1 presents an overview of selected characteristics for the whole sample (column 1), all mortgage-
shoppers (column 2), denied or discouraged mortgage-shoppers under proxy I (column 3), denied or dis-
couraged mortgage-shoppers under proxy II (column 4), and denied (column 5) and discouraged (column
6) both under proxy I. The means in the various samples are noticeably di⁄erent. Compared to households
in the whole sample, Denied or discouraged households (column 3) were more often married and headed
by males, white with more schooling and considerably younger. Their income was, on average, 57% higher
than that of households in the whole sample and 90% were currently employed compared to 71% for the
whole sample.
The denied or discouraged households had favorable demographic characteristics, irrespective of whether
proxy I (column 3) or proxy II is used (column 4). So, this observation does not simply follow from the
wording of the questionnaire. However, it is surely driven by the group of discouraged (column 6). Except
for the age of the household￿ s head, every categories display a higher average among discouraged applicants
(column 6) than among denied applicants (column 5). The two groups are noticeably heterogenous but for
the purpose of this study we follow the literature, and we assume both groups to be liquidity-constrained.
To some extent, it is not surprising that the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the
group of denied or discouraged shoppers were more favorable than those of the sample as a whole. In fact,
a vast majority of mortgage-shoppers obtained a loan or believed they could qualify for a loan during the
past ￿ve years. This intuition is con￿rmed when the group of shoppers is compared to the entire sample.
Mortgage-shoppers displayed the same favorable demographics, that is they had higher income, more years
of schooling, they did not belong to ethnic or gender minorities (column 2). What is surprising, however, is
the persistence of this pattern when denied or discouraged households (columns 3 and 4) are compared to
6mortgage-shoppers (column 2).6 In fact, denied or discouraged shoppers also display markedly favorable
characteristics than mortgage-shoppers.
To summarize, the characteristics of the denied and discouraged households display a systematic pat-
tern: among other things, they have high income, are married and have an employed head. With the
latter characteristics, the odds of having a demand for credit rejected should be very low. The contrast
with the pro￿le of a typical credit-constrained household is quite striking. This systematic pattern is
puzzling because it does not simply follow from households￿status as mortgage-shoppers. About 12% of
the PSID is concerned by this e⁄ect. Even considering measurement errors, this is a signi￿cant fraction of
the population.
3 Estimation results
In this section, we investigate whether the systematic pattern observed above is statistically persistent.
We follow Jappelli (1990) by using a Logit model to regress a binary indicator variable￿ taking the value
of 1 if the household is classi￿ed as denied or discouraged, and 0 if not￿ on a list of explanatory variables
consisting of household head and household socioeconomic attributes. The model relates the household￿ s
experience applying for, or thinking of applying for a mortgage-loan during the previous ￿ve years to its
current characteristics (hereafter, scenario I). The validity of this model rests on the assumption that many
of the determinants of the probability of being liquidity-constrained evolve slowly over time.7
In the regressions, family income, home equity, family size, age, years of schooling and the constant are
all quantitative variables, whereas sex, racial group, marital status, employment status, ownership status
and geographic locations are dummy variables. The reference categories are: women, singles, nonwhites,
no homeownership, unemployed, neither live in North East and North Central nor live in the South.
Based on both previous studies and intuition, one expects the sign of income level, homeownership
status, and marital status to be negative. For example, married-heads should increase their chances of
6Beside, given the level of their monthly mortgage payments ($1,542), denied or discouraged shoppers were able to borrow
substantially higher amount, at some point, than to mortgage-shoppers ($516). They certaintly have higher debt service
ratio because the monthly mortgage payments are three times higher while the income is not.
7Most of the studies on the U.S. economy assume that an individual is more likely to be borrowing constrained sometime
in the future if she is borrowing constrained today. This assumption is almost imposed by data limitation because surveys
are not conducted every year and/or questions relative to the credit status are not included in every survey.
7obtaining the desired loan amount by co-signing their home mortgage loan application with their spouse.
In general, there is no consensus regarding the sign of the age variable. In the case of mortgage borrowing,
however, the need to accumulate enough savings to meet down payment constraints suggest that this sign
should be negative. If the level of education captures the prospect of future income, one expects heads
with more education to have less chances of being rejected.
Column I in Table 2 presents the results of the baseline regression. Most characteristics of the denied
or discouraged are statistically better than the whole sample. The coe¢ cients of the income level, home-
ownership status, and marital status are highly signi￿cant, but none of their signs accord to expectations.
Instead, all three variables prove to be positively related to the probability of being liquidity-constrained.
It is not due to discrimination as neither the gender variable nor the race variable are signi￿cant. Moreover,
redlining seems not to be the issue either because all regional variables are non-signi￿cant and all display
a negative sign.
The signi￿cance of age and age squared variables suggest important life-cycle e⁄ects. As the household￿ s
head becomes older, the probability of being denied or discouraged rises. The non-linearity with respect
to the age variable is inherited from the age pro￿le of home ownership which is hump-shaped as in most
countries (see for example Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003). Finally, the education variable is signi￿cantly
positive. The likelihood of being denied or discouraged increases with the head￿ s years of schooling. It is
especially true for the group of denied and discouraged shoppers in our sample because of their already
high income levels and young age relative to the whole sample. This amount to the previous ￿nding which
not only are signi￿cant but display the opposite sign to what is expected.
These ￿ndings are driven by the group of discouraged shoppers (see column III). Only the income
variable is signi￿cant when we estimate the model for the sample of denied shoppers but most of the signs
are unchanged, except for the race variable. From column IV, all the ￿ndings carry on if instead one
excludes from the group of discouraged those respondents who answered ￿Other￿to the possible reasons
they considered a loan but decided not to apply.
4 Further estimations
In the previous section, we found that for the average American household shopping for a home loan, the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9icantly with family income, home equity, household head￿ s employment status or educational attainment.
In what follows, we try to explain why our results diverge so markedly from previous studies.
4.1 Accounting for timing issues
We start by departing from our assumption that access to credit evolve slowly over time. Given the cross-
section nature of our dataset, one cannot rule out that ￿timing issues￿contaminated the main ￿ndings. For
example, it could be the case that the conditions of denied or discouraged households in our sample only
improved recently as they build a credit history or they accumulated savings to make a down payment.
Accordingly, individuals most likely to be constrained are the young, especially at the beginning of their
careers and who anticipate signi￿cant growth in income. In the U.S., this constraint has been found to
be binding in the age groups 26-35 and 36-45 (see Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003), with the bulk of denied or
discouraged shoppers falling into the 36-45 age bracket.
To control for timing issues, we use the longitudinal aspect of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) to allocate denied/discouraged households the time-variant socioeconomic attributes (education,
marital and employment status, area of residence, age, family size) they had the year they were either
denied access to credit or discouraged from applying for it. For instance, those households reportedly
denied/discouraged in 1991 were allocated the statistical information provided that year. We then proceed
to estimate a logit model where denied or discouraged applicants are allocated their past characteristics
(henceforth, scenario II).
In Table 3, we reproduce Table 2 under scenario II. First and foremost, notice that some variables
acquire an independent e⁄ect (employment status) or become more signi￿cant (family size) when comparing
column I with the baseline regression. However, there is no sign reversal and the puzzling ￿ndings of Table
2 persist if one uses past characteristics. The only signi￿cant variable with the expected sign is the family
size variable, as applicants with large family are more likely to be denied or discouraged. Based on these
experiments, there is little support for the hypothesis that recent improvements of applicants￿conditions
caused the results in Table 2. Scenario II is also useful to control for business cycles factors.
4.2 Accounting for creditworthiness
Having a bad credit history may o⁄set an applicant￿ s chances to obtain a loan even with favorable demo-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11history with those obtained using the denied or discouraged measure.
We classify as bad creditworthy, respondents who declared themselves ￿unable to pay [your] bills when
they were due￿in the last ￿ve years. Not paying bills could be a minor blunder that can be committed both
by mortgage shoppers as well as non-shoppers, yet, it signals a state of ￿nancial distress. The delinquency
in repaying liabilities is an important indicator of credit worthiness; and, a bad credit history may lower
an applicant￿ s chances to obtain a loan even with favorable demographics.
This new measure is also suitable to capture liquidity-constrained households. Evidence of shoppers
facing liquidity constraints can be found both for homeowners and non owners. Englehardt (1996) found
that down payment constraints force ￿rst-time home buyers to reduce consumption in the period prior to
accessing homeownership. Hurst and Sta⁄ord (2004) isolated a group of homeowners who were liquidity-
constrained. They found that faced with adverse income shocks, households in the latter group typically
re￿nance and draw down their home equity, albeit that is an expensive source of funds. Unlike nonliquidity-
constrained re￿nancers, they use the equity they liquidated to ￿nance current consumption.8
In Table 4, we present logit estimates of the determinants of credit status based on the new proxy. The
signs for the coe¢ cients of total income, education, marital status and the family size are the reverse of
those obtained with the denied or discouraged measure (see column III of Table 1). Liquidity-constrained
households are seen to have a lower total income, to be larger in size, to be headed by a less educated
individual and less likely to be married. The coe¢ cient for the latter variables are highly signi￿cant within
both the group of mortgage shoppers and all households. Notice that, the coe¢ cient of the age variables
keep the same signs and are still highly signi￿cant across all three groups, signaling the presence of strong
cohort e⁄ects.
The group of households with bad creditworthiness is markedly di⁄erent than the group of denied or
discouraged shoppers. We conclude that factors other than a bad credit history explain our ￿ndings.
4.3 Discussion
The characteristics of the group of denied or discouraged are too systematic to be spurious. Neither timing
issues nor the credit worthiness seem to explain our ￿ndings. It seems that the denied or discouraged
measure, in our sample, captures an e⁄ect that has nothing to do with the credit status per se, while still
8The equity they removed when re￿nancing can be used to adjust the housing stock (do up, build additions, etc.) or to
readjust their portfolio by allocating some of their housing equity into other ￿nancial assets.
12Table 4: Logit Models of Liquidity-Constrained (￿unable to pay bills￿ ) U.S Household
Variables Full sample Mortgage shoppers Non-shoppers







￿￿￿ (6.17) 0.031 (0.13)
Home equity -0.056
￿￿￿ (4.16) -0.030 (1.59) -0.102
￿￿￿ (5.75)
Employed 0.054 (0.68) -0.260







￿￿￿ (3.61) -0.154 (1.41)
Male -0.223
￿￿￿ (2.86) -0.139 (0.89) -0.259
￿￿￿ (2.88)
White -0.095 (1.49) -0.223














North East -0.006 (0.07) 0.139 (0.98) -0.118 (1.06)
North Central 0.056 (0.67) 0.430
￿￿￿ (3.20) -0.176 (1.61)
South -0.071 (0.85) 0.079 (0.59) -0.165 (1.51)
Constant -1.000
￿￿￿ (3.22) 0.025 (0.04) -1.074
￿￿ (2.93)






Source: see Table 3
13being correlated with a behavior associated with the credit application process. In what follows we will
conjecture that the denied or discouraged measure captures best the intensity put forth by the applicant
when shopping for a loan.
Since our ￿ndings are driven by the group of discouraged households, we try infer the underlying
behavior from the latter group. It is very telling because the interest-rate is the principal metric for
loan-to-loan comparisons. More than 50% are discouraged because of ￿interest rate too high￿ (around
40% chose ￿Other￿ ). Thus, giving up on one lender when doing comparison shopping, because of high
interest rate, would also qualify as being ￿discouraged￿ .9 The question therefore is: why are applicants
with ￿favorable￿characteristics, such as those found above, also more willing to do comparison shopping?
We provide some descriptive evidence drawn from the 1996 PSID in order to illustrate the search
intensity. First, it appears that 43% of applicants among denied or discouraged shoppers had no business
relationship with the lender from whom they obtained a mortgage loan; compared to only 30% of shoppers
who were not denied or discouraged. Second, relative to the other two groups, denied or discouraged
households certainly have a large desired-consumption of housing because on average they have more
family members (see Table 2). It follows that their intensity of search is likely to have been higher as well,
everything else being equal.10
Numerous studies have linked information frictions to consumer behaviors in several asset and debt
markets. For instance, information barriers explain the ￿non-participation puzzle￿ , that is the fact that
some individuals choose zero holdings for stocks and other ￿nancial assets (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005).
Information costs are also related to the borrowers￿lack of knowledge of their contractual terms (Bucks
and Pence, 2008; and Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). In both cases, acquiring and processing information is
likely to be more costly for borrowers with less income and education, older borrowers and minorities.11
Consequently, having high income and being more educated makes denied or discouraged shoppers
more likely to a⁄ord these information costs. If the latter claim is true, one expects the holding of
￿nancial assets to be more widespread among denied or discouraged households. As it turns out the
proportion of households that are participating in ￿nancial markets is higher for denied or discouraged
9Crook (1999) distinguishes between households who are discouraged from those who are not. He focuses on applicants
who think the Equal Credit Opportunities Act (1976) is not respected by certain lenders.
10The intensity put forth when shopping increases with the size of the expenditures to be ￿nanced (Stigler, 1961).
11This is particularly true for the mortgage market because of both the inherent complexity of ￿nancial information and
the proliferation of product choices dimensions.
14mortgage-shoppers relative to both mortgage-shoppers, and the whole sample. More than 47.6% of denied
or discouraged shoppers (proxy II) have a participation rate greater than zero compared to 31.9% for the
whole sample, and 42.39% for the group of shoppers.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to assess the reliability of the denied or discouraged measure in capturing
credit-constrained households in the particular case of consumers seeking credit to ￿nance expenditure on
durables. Using a sample of American households, we have isolated a group of consumers who have been
denied or discouraged at some point during their search process for a mortgage loan. We have shown that:
for this pool of consumers, the odds of having their demand for credit rejected should be very low based on
the variables used to screen credit applications. About 12% of the PSID could be incorrectly classi￿ed as
credit constrained. Even considering measurement errors, this is a signi￿cant fraction of the population.
While we cannot de￿nitely state what caused the phenomenon documented in section 3, the evidence
seem to support the idea that the intensity of search is the behavior captured by the denied or discouraged
indicator in the mortgage market. The di¢ culty in identifying credit-constrained households is to ￿nd
a measure that applies indi⁄erently to all the sample, and irrespective of the type of expenditures to be
￿nanced.12 Ultimately, this paper suggests that further research is required to identify credit constrained
households.
12Classifying as liquidity-constrained, respondents who declared themselves ￿unable to pay [your] bills when they were
due￿ seems to overcome this di¢ culty (see Table 4). In fact, not paying bills can be committed indi⁄erently by mortgage
shoppers as well as non-shoppers. Using this measure, 25% of the U.S. households are liquidity-constrained as opposed to
the 20% found by Jappelli (1990).
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